

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NEW YORK TIMES
24 January 1985

STAT

CBS Jury Told of C.I.A. 'Sellout' in '67

By M. A. FARBER

George W. Allen, a former deputy chief of Vietnamese affairs for the Central Intelligence Agency, testified yesterday that the C.I.A. had "sold out" to the military in 1967 on the issue of enemy strength in South Vietnam and that President Lyndon B. Johnson had been given a "dishonest and misleading" estimate that fall.

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Mr. Allen said in Federal District Court in Manhattan that Gen. William C. Westmoreland was "ultimately responsible" for "this prostitution" and that the C.I.A., by "going along with it," had "sacrificed its integrity on the altar of public relations and political expediency."

As a result, Mr. Allen testified, Washington was left "essentially with an inadequate understanding of what we were up against" in Vietnam.

During the Tet offensive of January 1968, Mr. Allen said, "the chickens came home to roost." He estimated that at least 400,000 armed troops took part in that attack — perhaps 100,000 more than the total enemy acknowledged by the military and the C.I.A. at that time. Mr. Allen said that, during 1967, he and some C.I.A. colleagues had actually argued for an enemy force estimate of about 500,000.

Mr. Allen, who retired from the C.I.A. in 1979 but still works under contract there, appeared as the second witness for CBS in the trial of General Westmoreland's $120 million libel suit against the network.

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25-Page Estimate for President

The suit stems from a 1982 CBS documentary — "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception" — which charged that the general's command engaged in a "conspiracy" in 1967 to show progress in the war by minimizing the size and nature of North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. As part of this "conscious effort," the broadcast said, General Westmoreland removed the Vietcong's part-time, hamlet-based self-defense forces from the listing of enemy strength known as the order of battle and refused to allow a current count for them in the 25-page special estimate for the President in November 1967.

Mr. Allen — who testified Tuesday afternoon that the self-defense forces might have accounted for as much as 40 percent of American casualties in Vietnam — said yesterday that it was a "lie" that those units could not be counted accurately.

"We existed," he said, "to make estimates."

Mr. Allen seemed on the verge of laying part of the blame for the C.I.A.'s "sellout" on Richard Helms, who was then Director of Central Intelligence and who signed the estimate for the President.

Mr. Helms, he said at one stage, "made it clear to our staff that he was not prepared ..." Judge Pierre N. Leval cut the witness off and called the lawyers to the bench for a private conference. Later, Mr. Allen said only that he heard Mr. Helms "express himself on more than one occasion" about the conflict with the military over the figures.

Mr. Helms is not expected to testify at this trial. In a pre-trial affidavit solicited by General Westmoreland's lawyers, he said that the "disagreement" over enemy strength was not "fundamental to the conduct of the war," that he was under no pressure from "the military or any other source" to accept low numbers and that the estimate he signed "represented the highest quality of intelligence analysis given the 'softness' of much of the data."

Mr. Allen said that, in 1975, when a Congressional inquiry was conducted into the dispute, he was told by William Colby, who had succeeded Mr. Helms, to be "guarded" in his House testimony.

Mr. Allen recalled driving to Capitol Hill with Mr. Colby and others on the day of their appearance. Mr. Colby, he said, looked at him and said he "didn't want to put ourselves in the position of attacking the military."

"I now see very clearly it was a whitewash," Mr. Allen told the jury, "and I regret I conformed." The C.I.A., he said, wanted to "sweep" the earlier conflict "under the rug."

General Westmoreland, who commanded American forces in Vietnam from January 1964 to June 1968, contends that CBS defamed him by saying he had lied to the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the true size of the enemy.

The general denied a charge on the broadcast that he had imposed an "arbitrary ceiling" of 300,000 on reports of enemy strength. He testified that he deleted the self-defense forces — newly estimated at 120,000 by his intelligence chief in 1967 — because he believed that they were insignificant militarily and that their inclusion at a higher number in the order of battle or the estimate for the President would be misleading.

Until the summer and fall of 1967, when the C.I.A. and the military quarreled over a new estimate, the military listed the enemy size at 298,000, including about 70,000 self-defense forces and the Vietcong's political cadre as well. The new estimate — which George Carver, who was then chief of Vietnamese affairs for the C.I.A., has testified was a "compromise" — put enemy military strength at 223,000 to 248,000, excluding the self-defense forces. Moreover, the political cadre was relegated to a separate listing, numbered at 85,000.

Yesterday, in response to a question by Judge Leval, Mr. Allen questioned the diversion of the political cadre. "They were armed and part of the enemy's command and not just a group of politicians carrying weapons," he said. "They would fit the term paramilitary, as I construe the term."

Earlier in the 15-week-old trial, Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, retired director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified that only 85,000 to 90,000 enemy troops took part in the Tet offensive. Other witnesses for General Westmoreland used a similar figure.

But Mr. Allen said yesterday that his figure of 400,000 troops was based on a trip he made to Vietnam in February 1968 with Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Philip Habib, a State Department official. The military's estimate for the units in the January offensive, Mr. Allen told the jury, was "a gross understatement" and excluded hundreds of assaults on hamlets by forces not listed in the order of battle.

Mr. Allen said he learned on his trip that in one region in Vietnam, where an intelligence officer in the field had reported that all but 3 of 33 enemy battalions had been wiped out before Tet — with the remaining 3 "cowering in sanctuary in Cambodia" — 45 battalions actually participated in the offensive "at essentially full strength."

The New York Times/Marilyn Church

George W. Allen testifying yesterday at libel trial.

"In essence," he testified, "not only had 30 of them not been wiped out, but the 33 had been reinforced by 12 more."

Mr. Allen, who was calm and deliberate through most of his testimony, suddenly became agitated when he recalled an incident in April 1968 involving General Graham, who was then a colonel in General Westmoreland's command.

By that time, Mr. Allen said, the C.I.A. had "broken the constraints" of the military and was insisting, at a conference in Washington, on higher enemy force estimates. But Colonel Graham, he said, "embarked on another rambling attempt" to portray the self-defense forces as old women and boys "and not important."

Leaning forward in the witness chair and nearly shouting, Mr. Allen said he had challenged the point.

"You don't really believe that," he recalled remarking.

"Of course I don't, but it's the command position and I'm sticking with it," he said the colonel replied.

"That example of intellectual prostitution," Mr. Allen told the jury, was "a low point of my career — I left the conference."

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
20 January 1985

The Director: Running The C.I.A.

By Joseph Lelyveld

FOR THE CENTRAL Intelligence Agency and its frequently embattled leader, William J. Casey, the start of the second Reagan Administration is more than just the halfway mark in a marathon. Ronald Reagan is the first President in 12 years to take the oath of office for a second time, but it has been 16 years since a head of the American intelligence community last managed to continue in office from one Presidential term to the next. On the previous occasion, in 1969, Richard M. Nixon reluctantly gave in to an argument that he should retain Richard M. Helms as Director of Central Intelligence in order to safeguard the nonpartisan character of the office. There have been five directors since, and Casey — whom no one has ever called nonpartisan — has now survived longest of them all.

This can be regarded as a footnote, a fluke, or an indication that the C.I.A. has essentially weathered the investigations and strictures of the 1970's, that it has recovered much of its old effectiveness and mystique. The present director, who would naturally favor the latter interpretation, has tried to function as if it were so, casting himself in the mold of Allen W. Dulles and John A. McCone, who flourished in the 1950's and early 60's, before serious questions had been raised, on either moral or pragmatic grounds, about covert action on a global scale. Like them, rather than like his immediate predecessors, he has been recognized in Washington and beyond for having ready access to the President. Like them, he has not hesitated to make his voice heard at the White House on policy matters as distinct from intelligence evaluations. (Indeed, he might even be said to have surpassed them in this respect, for, serving a President who values the Cabinet as a forum, he has managed to become the first Director of Central Intelligence ever to sit at the table as a participating Cabinet member.) And like Dulles in particular — fondly known to his subordinates as "the great white case officer" because of his consuming passion for espionage and related games — Mr. Casey is believed to have immersed himself deeply in the day-to-day management of clandestine operations.

Yet for an assortment of reasons — some personal, others having to do with changing times and changed expectations of a director — no one would suggest that official Washington has learned to view William Casey reliving his youth.

Conservative members, who can be nearly as harsh, tend to portray him as the opposite of an activist director: that is, as a captive of a Langley bureaucracy whose major objective, it is alleged, is to shield itself from controversy. The two images overlap, in that neither takes him very seriously as an effective Director of Central Intelligence or an influence on policy, either broadly on matters of national security or narrowly on matters specific to the intelligence community.

What is involved here is more than a clash of perceptions about Casey. It is also a clash of perceptions about what a Director of Central Intelligence should be and, beyond that, about how ready the United States should be to intervene secretly — politically and, especially, militarily — in the affairs of other countries. On both sides — those who think this director is too active and those who think he is not nearly active enough — there is a tendency to forget the fundamental insight that emerged from the investigations of the 1970's: that all directors, finally, are creatures of the Presidents they serve. If Presidents hear intelligence about the world that conflicts with what they would rather believe, they have the option of setting it aside. But no director can ignore the President's goals. The different ways directors interpret their jobs reflect differences among the Presidents who picked them.

Joseph Lelyveld is a staff writer for this magazine.

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Ex-CIA analyst details accusations

STAT

By David Zucchino
Inquirer Staff Writer

NEW YORK — Nearly 20 years after he first accused Gen. William C. Westmoreland's command of "cooking the books" on enemy strength in Vietnam, former CIA analyst Samuel A. Adams told his story to a jury yesterday.

Adams, who has long maintained that Westmoreland deceived U.S. policy-makers about the size of the enemy, now stands accused by Westmoreland of libel. Allegations by Adams formed the basis of a 1982 CBS documentary for which Westmoreland has sued the network, Adams and two other people for $120 million.

Yesterday, the jury heard Adams, 51, describe himself in a 1981 videotaped interview — parts of which were used in the documentary — as a "galloping Paul Revere" who has tried since 1966 to alert the country to a "monument of deceit" by Westmoreland's command. CBS paid Adams $25,000 as a consultant for the documentary but did not mention his paid role in the broadcast.

Settling his broad frame into the witness stand, Adams meticulously outlined his accusations against Westmoreland and his command. Sometimes digressing into trivial details but showing a strong command of dates and statistics, he gave a step-by-step account of how he became convinced that Westmoreland had altered and suppressed estimates of his own command.

Under questioning by CBS attorney David Boies, Adams testified as the first CBS witness in the trial, now in its 13th week. He outlined a pattern of what he called "manipulation" by Westmoreland's command to keep higher estimates produced by Adams and the CIA out of a special report being prepared for President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. The CIA's estimates, based largely on Adams' research, put total enemy strength at 460,000 to 570,000. Westmoreland's command put the total at just under 300,000.

In the broadcast, *The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception*, CBS said Westmoreland placed an arbitrary "ceiling" of 300,000 on the totals his own officers could report. His motive, the program said, was to make it appear that he was winning the war and killing off the enemy.

Citing discussions with Westmoreland's intelligence officers and meetings he had attended with them, Adams said Westmoreland imposed the ceiling even though his own officers had agreed at a major conference in February 1967 that their estimates "should be radically increased." But in August 1967, Adams said, Westmoreland's command suddenly and arbitrarily dropped an entire category of the enemy from its order of battle, listing enemy strength so that the total would not exceed the ceiling.

"I was taken aback, amazed, was made suspicious," Adams said, describing his reaction to the dropping of the Viet Cong's self-defense, or village militia, forces. The broadcast said the self-defense forces were dropped by Westmoreland as a "tactic" to "deceive" his superiors about enemy strength.

Reminded by Boies that Westmoreland and several other witnesses have testified that discrepancies stemmed from a "good-faith debate" over statistical procedures, Adams said that by January 1968, "I had reached a conclusion there had been a deception."

"And this was not something that was fabricated, manufactured in the 1980s?" Boies asked.

"No, sir," Adams replied.

Westmoreland, his chin resting on his palm, listened impassively to Adams' testimony. Several of Westmoreland's former officers have testified that Adams was "obsessed" with troop estimates and has waged a vendetta against Westmoreland.

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George Carver, Adams' former boss at the CIA, has testified that Adams considered those who disagreed with him to be "either fools or knaves." Carver also said: "Mr. Adams was often in error but seldom in doubt."

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Yesterday, Boies introduced a September 1967 cable sent from Saigon by Carver to Richard Helms, then the CIA director in Washington. Carver wrote that he had come to "the inescapable conclusion that General Westmoreland ... has given instruction tantamount to direct order that VC [Viet Cong] strength total will not exceed 300,000 ceiling. Rationale seems to be that any higher figure would not be sufficiently optimistic and would generate unacceptable level of criticism from the press."

Adams and Carver had gone to Saigon to try to persuade Westmoreland's command to honor their commitment the previous February to increase its estimates.

"So far," Carver wrote to Helms, "our mission frustratingly unproductive since [Westmoreland's command] stonewalling, obviously under orders."

In the 36-minute videotaped interview with CBS correspondent Mike Wallace, a co-defendant, Adams described how captured enemy documents he analyzed in the summer of 1966 convinced him that the estimates issued by Westmoreland's command were "baloney."

"I was galloping around [CIA headquarters] like Paul Revere saying, my God, you know, there's a hell of a lot more Viet Cong out there than we say there are," Adams told Wallace.

Adams said he had pointed out that Westmoreland's intelligence officers had been including self-defense forces in the order of battle since 1961. He reminded them, he said, that the forces were included in enemy "body counts" sent to Washington to show progress in the war.

"And I said, look, if you're going to count these people when they're dead, why can't you count them when they're still alive?"

On Jan. 30, 1968, the enemy launched its powerful Tet offensive across South Vietnam. The CBS broadcast said Westmoreland's supposed deceit left U.S. policymakers unprepared for the scope of the offensive.

"What had happened was that we had dug our own grave," Adams told Wallace. "We had been telling everybody right and left, in the papers, everybody ... that the enemy's manpower was declining, and it was all baloney.

"And then all of a sudden you had this enormous attack ... and it was clear that they couldn't have done what they did with the amount of men we said they had."

Wallace told Adams he was making "an awful accusation" that Westmoreland's command had endangered the lives of its own men by misrepesenting the size of the enemy.

"You're absolutely persuaded you're right about this?" Wallace asked.

Adams answered quickly: "Absolutely."

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WASHINGTON POST
10 January 1985

STAT

Sam Adams' Vietnam Obsession

At Westmoreland Trial, the Ex-CIA Man & His Theory

STAT

By Eleanor Randolph
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW YORK—What is most striking about Samuel Alexander Adams—the man whose theory about Vietnam has been on trial here for the last three months—is that there is no discernible anger in his manner.

Day after day, the former CIA analyst, one of the codefendants in retired general William C. Westmoreland's $120 million libel action against CBS, has listened to the general's friends and lawyers describe Adams as obsessed, monomaniacal. Or, as his former boss at the CIA, George Carver, told the court in November, Adams "was very intolerant of people who did not share the conclusions to which he jumped."

It has become clear that this multimillion-dollar trial would not have occurred without his fixation, his dedication to what is now widely known as the "Adams theory," born 17 years ago in a cubicle at CIA headquarters when he first suspected that the U.S. government was suppressing the truth about enemy troop strength in Vietnam. It is that theory, central to a 1982 CBS documentary, that Westmoreland asserts libeled him.

For three months, Adams, who takes the stand today, has sat at the end of the defense table in U.S. District Court. Wearing rumpled tweeds, scribbling notes on his voluminous chronologies or "chronos," even taking down slurs on his own character, he shows only serenity. Outside the courtroom, he has joked with reporters, saying, for example, that Carver is "a nice funny guy, who, of course, was wrong."

Perhaps Adams' ease stems from a satisfaction that his views have finally received the public forum he has been yearning for; or perhaps it is from his belief that he is absolutely right.

"In fact, to be honest, for me this trial is a bonanza," he said during one of the periods when his motives were under strongest attack here. "I'm a researcher, but when have researchers ever had the power of subpoena?" he added, his soft voice difficult to hear even when talking about what is clearly his life's passion. "It is almost unique in that usually when these things are released, all the principals are dead."

Now, when Adams testifies as the first live witness for CBS in defense of the documentary, it will be his day in court, the ultimate airing of one of the nation's best-researched intelligence theories.

And Adams, who was a paid consultant to CBS Reports for the program, will have to convince the jury that he is stubborn only because he is principled, a man at odds with his government's leaders only because he believed they were not doing their jobs and certainly not doing their best.

Says one of his closest friends, author John Rolfe Gardiner, "I think the man is incredible—a hero of our time. I hope they will be able to recognize it."

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In some ways Sam Adams is the most fascinating and least known of the parade of characters who have been a part of this long, complicated courtroom drama over the CBS show "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception."

Shy, handsome, his humor almost always at his own expense, Adams has a gentle way, like a befuddled professor who recognizes that even some of his friends see his fondness for one thin slice of time and history as amusingly eccentric.

But underneath that shambling exterior, Adams is as obdurate as Plymouth Rock, a man as caught up with his version of the truth as some of his famous forebears. A fourth cousin, seven times removed, of President John Adams, the living Sam Adams (no direct kin to the American revolutionary Samuel Adams) has bloodlines deep in the American establishment.

His father, Pierpont Adams, who was probably named after Pierpont Morgan, had a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. And in one of the odd ironies of this trial, Pierpont's partner was the late Ellsworth Bunker, former ambassador to Vietnam who, had he lived, might have testified against his former partner's son.

The list of Adams' schools is consistent with such connections. He went to St. Mark's School in Massachusetts and on to Harvard (history) '55. "The same year as Teddy Kennedy, whom I didn't know," Adams says. Then there was the Navy, and after that, as if reconnoitering for the troubled young in the 1960s, there was his lost period, a youth's thrashing around to determine where to use his formidable energies.

For a while, there was ski bumming, but, as Adams put it, "I quit when the snow melted, and I didn't know what else to do." Then, like many of his old associates, he tried law school, but found Harvard's attorney factory not to his liking. Then there was banking until Aug. 16, 1962, the day after he married Eleanor McGowen, the elegant daughter of a patrician Alabama family. "Mr. McGowen must have been in shock—this jerk . . . quit his banking job the day after he married his daughter," Adams recalled.

Having then run through most of the professions of America's gentlemanly class, Adams looked to the government, the Agency. It was an era, much like today, when the Agency lured many of the brightest and most sensitive young men out of the nation's elite colleges.

"I had no idea I would like it or that I was likely to be good at it," Adams said recently of the junior officer trainee job that he landed in March 1963.

A year later Adams began working on the Congo desk. Acknowledging that he skimmed through Harvard and dawdled at other jobs, Adams suddenly hit intellectual pay dirt at the CIA.

Continued

'I found to my astonishment that I really loved the place. I approved of it, luck," he said, carefully adding, as he always does, "although I realize that's totally quixotic."

Adams began studying the tribes in the Congo, following the basic rule of good intelligence that, first, one learns everything available on the subject. *Everything*, he stressed, his soft voice rising only slightly for emphasis. Then, you can begin predicting, extrapolating from the known to the expected.

Adams said that such a mountain of research allowed him to predict such things as that Uganda would invade the Congo—a notion that brought snickers, he recalled, from the State Department.

When Uganda did invade the Congo—fulfilling his prediction about the area Adams knew only by maps and documents he memorized with a watchmaker's eye for detail—Adams became the golden boy at the CIA.

"It was like rockets going off. It was terrific—one of the high points in my life," he remembered recently.

"There's no crystal ball. It isn't luck," Adams said of the analyst's job. "The key to good intelligence is good files, knowing what's in them and how to retrieve them."

From the Congo, Adams was promoted to the Vietnamese affairs section at the CIA's Langley headquarters, trying to sift through documents that sometimes lie and sometimes don't, to figure out how many people were really out there fighting the United States in the early stages of this long war.

What became his 17-year-old battle with the government started in the Vietnamese town of Tan An in 1966 as he sat in a hot, dusty room looking through dossiers about communist defectors to the South Vietnamese side. When he counted the defectors in that area there were 120, but when he happened to look at the official U.S. document that showed how many Viet Cong guerrillas there were supposed to be, it said 160, he says. That should have left a scant 40 in the field—a fact he remembers as being merely puzzling, at that stage.

A few months later, back in Washington, Adams says, he began comparing Army figures in one province that showed 50,000 Viet Cong guerrillas and militia. The official order of battle, though, said there were 4,500. He did not shout "Eureka!," but for Adams it was The Moment, the discovery that sent him hurtling into a life and obsession, seemingly against his own best interests.

"My jaw just clattered to the floor," he likes to recall. "I started galloping around the CIA headquarters like Paul Revere."

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In retrospect, it may be that Paul Revere wouldn't make such a good bureaucrat. Within the agency, until he resigned in 1973, Adams became like a sorcerer's apprentice, toting enemy troop data to bosses already drowning in his carefully researched but politically troublesome numbers. Adams kept pushing for enemy troop totals that the military said were too high, that the brass believed were wrong and would turn an already skittish public permanently against this war.

When they didn't listen, Adams didn't retreat submissively to his cubicle. At first he protested, resigning from the Vietnam Affairs staff in 1968 and calling the agency's compromise on enemy data with the Army in 1967 a "monument of deceit."

From elsewhere in the agency, by the early '70s, he had begun to collect what Westmoreland's lawyers call "the purloined documents" on Vietnam—a series of papers, many of which he hid in a leaf bag buried on his wife's 250-acre cattle farm in Northern Virginia until one sack sprang a leak and his treasured secret data began to decompose.

Friends, many of them neighbors on the posh Loudoun County farmlands, say that this may have been the period when his marriage showed early signs of strain. His wife and son began to suffer from the fears that their phone was tapped by the CIA. They shared Adams' nervousness about being followed and the concern that the CIA might try to send him to jail or, worse, retaliate in less wholesome ways, their friends recalled.

Still, Adams persisted. Within the government, he tried to have the CIA investigate its director, then Richard Helms, and he wanted the Army to court-martial Westmoreland for "fabrication" of enemy strength figures during Westmoreland's command in Vietnam. Said R. Jack Smith, who was deputy director of intelligence at the agency during Adams' tour there, "Sam is a very charming man, extremely persuasive, and it never fails to surprise me how people who only know him socially get their impression of him. Our impression in the agency was rather different."

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Besides finding Adams as stubborn, difficult to work with, Smith said that Adams began to believe in 1967 that his extrapolation about figures from one province was the issue the war would turn on.

"He somehow failed to understand that he had a hold of part of the problem, not all of it," Smith said.

After voluntarily testifying for Daniel Ellsberg at his "Pentagon Papers" trial, making the case that the numbers Ellsberg was being tried for leaking were false anyway, Adams resigned from the agency, to the apparent relief of some of his superiors and to the dismay of a few of his fellow workers.

One CIA official who knew him well in those years and who still likes Adams said that he was one of the brightest young men the agency had seen in years. But in the end, he said, Adams was not a good analyst because he couldn't let go, he couldn't move to other fights once he had lost this one.

If there was a sense at the CIA that Adams was working at the wrong place, there is sometimes a sense with Adams that he is living in the wrong era.

After one of four visits to the Cloisters Museum and viewing the Unicorn tapestries there, Adams told reporters outside the courtroom: "I'm afraid I belong in the 12th century."

Adams' audience that day laughed, but there was an almost eerie reality to that comment, a realization that one could easily see Adams in a monk's robe, toiling in an ancient library on the most intricate details of an argument.

Thus, when Adams formally severed his ties with the agency and retired to the farm more than 12 years ago, he kept his theory afloat, traveling around the country interviewing participants in the 1967 intelligence debate about the enemy, searching, some say, always for confirmation.

Adams wrote an article in 1975 for Harper's magazine that accused the CIA of the primary sin in the intelligence business—tainting the facts with political realities. His editor on that piece was George Crile, who went to CBS a few years later, decided to do a show drawing on Adams' theory, and hired Adams for $25,000 as a consultant for CBS.

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Now a fellow codefendant in this case, Crile has said in the courtroom that he believed Adams is a "man of great confidence and in certain respects brilliance." Crile also said in court that Adams had "extraordinary integrity," even though memos suggested that Crile also believed Adams was "obsessed" and that his facts should be carefully verified elsewhere.

An attractive man, especially to women, one of whom calls him a "rustic Paul Newman" because of his compelling blue eyes and high cheekbones, Adams said he has few plans for life after the trial.

For those who knew him two years ago, Adams is suddenly gray—not so much from this trial, they say, as from an impending divorce that has moved him away from the farm that he said provided him with one of the true joys in his life since the CIA.

"I guess I'm the only downwardly mobile WASP I know," Adams joked about his uncertain future.

"I guess if I can't go back to the agency, I'd like to be a farmer," he said. "It's the only thing else that is satisfying."

BY NANCY KAYE FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Sam Adams is due to take the stand today in the Westmoreland case.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
10 January 1985

Can CIA Cratology Ultimately Outsmart Kremlin's Shellology?

* * *

Study of Crates on Soviet Ships Is a Big Help in Espionage If Shell Game Isn't Played

By Robert S. Greenberger
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON — Would James Bond study pictures of *crates* to figure out what the Russians are up to?

Not likely. Crates don't do much for the image.

But the Central Intelligence Agency has elevated crate espionage to a science. It is called cratology, the tongue-in-cheek name intelligence analysts have given to the study of crates and other containers used by the Soviets or their allies to ship military hardware around the world.

Currently, cratologists are keeping a close watch on some crates that arrived at the Bulgaria Black Sea port of Burgas last July. The analysts believe the crates, shipped from Libya, contain five L-39 Czechoslovakian aircraft that may be bound for Nicaragua. Keeping track of these crates on photographs is easy because the Libyans built the crates from two different shades of wood. "They're a piece of cake to pick up," one U.S. official brags.

Original Development

Cratologists have been monitoring such shipments ever since Moscow started delivering arms to Third World nations almost three decades ago. Experts study pictures, usually taken by surveillance satellites at different angles, to determine the dimensions and shapes of crates. They then compare the crates with similar packages they have seen earlier whose contents have been identified.

Sometimes, cratologists build scale models of the packages and their suspected contents to see whether the cargo would fit in the container. Such models were used during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to help convince President Kennedy that the cratologists' assessments were accurate.

Cratology has played a largely secret role in several other U.S.-Soviet diplomatic flaps. During a routine examination of surveillance photographs in 1978, analysts noticed something unusual about crates being loaded aboard ship at a Soviet Black Sea port. Cratologists knew that most Soviet aircraft are broken down into three sections for crating and shipping: a crate for the wings, one for the fuselage and a third for the tail assembly. Some of the crates showed the characteristics of MiG-21 packages, yet the crates were larger.

New Model of MiG

Intelligence analysts tracked the ship as it traveled south to the Mediterranean Sea and across the Atlantic to the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. When the crates were unpacked, intelligence sources on the ground confirmed the cratologists' suspicions: The Cubans had received MiG-23 aircraft, a more advanced fighter than the MiG-21 that hadn't yet been introduced into the Western Hemisphere until then. The arrival of new weapons in Cuba "caused a fair amount of flutter in the Carter administration," a former intelligence official says.

If cratology has a father, it probably is Arthur Lundahl, who retired in 1973 as director of National Photographic Interpretation Center. Mr. Lundahl, who did photo interpretation for the Navy in World War II, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1953 to organize the agency's photographic-intelligence activities. He set up shop above a Ford auto dealership in Washington. "It was a flea-bag place," he recalls.

Photographic technology has advanced so far that cameras on today's satellites and spy planes can photograph details as small as the numbers on a license plate. Photo reading, at the same time, has evolved into "photo-grammetry," or the science of discerning exact dimensions from photographs. And analysts who spend part of their time studying photographs of crates and other containers have been dubbed cratologists.

In the mid-1950s, the Soviets began shipping arms to Egypt, Syria, Ghana and other Third World clients. Most of the shipments consisted of the same items: MiG aircraft, T-34 tanks and artillery pieces. Because these items were bulky, they were transported above deck, packed in crates, making them easy targets for the CIA's photographic eyes. Analysts began cataloging these items and soon were able to identify them from the crates.

In 1962, analysts studying satellite photos of crates being shipped to Cuba by the Soviets gave the Kennedy administration its initial warning that a major arms buildup was under way. Dino Brugioni, a CIA photo analyst at the time, says cratologists identified shipments to Cuba of Komar guided-missile patrol boats, MiG-21s and IL-28 "Beagle" bombers. Alerted by these early signs, U.S. intelligence analysts discovered in mid-October that Moscow was delivering missiles to Cuba, touching off the Cuban missile crisis.

Ray Cline, then deputy director of the CIA, recalls that at a staff meeting during which the early findings were discussed somebody said, "Hey, we've invented a new science here—cratology!"

Mr. Cline says that his analysts also discovered that the tents used by Soviet personnel in Cuba were different from the Cubans' tents, which had a one-foot-wide gauze ventilation band around the top. U.S. analysts using surveillance photographs, therefore, could track the movements of the Russian technicians in the field who were assembling the missiles. "We began calling it tentology," Mr. Cline quips.

Officials don't like to discuss cratology for fear of revealing too much information about their surveillance, photo-analysis and computerized information-processing capabilities. To the dismay of the intelligence community, that secrecy was pierced in early November when certain government officials leaked reports that crates containing MiG-21s might be on their way to Nicaragua.

The crates had first been photographed by satellite in late September at the Soviet port of Nikoloyev, but then a heavy cloud cover obscured the satellite's view for three days, according to intelligence officials. When the next pictures were taken, the crates were gone and a ship large enough to accommodate them below deck, the Bakuriani, also had left port. When the ship headed for the Nicaraguan port of Corinto in early November, stories about its suspected cargo were leaked. However, the crates weren't unloaded in Corinto.

What happened to the crates that set off the recent crate crisis? Some analysts speculate that the Soviets, pressured by the publicity, decided the delivery would be too provocative. Other analysts say the crates were never loaded on the ship. Rather, they say, the photograph showed crates of MiGs being returned to the Soviets for repairs, a common practice for Third World nations.

A third theory suggests that the Soviets may, at times, turn the science of cratology to their advantage. Richard Helms, a former CIA director, speculates that perhaps the Soviets have converted cratology into a giant shell game, in which they move empty crates about in an effort to test U.S. reactions. Even as you read this, the shellologists may be busily at work in the Kremlin.

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